The Final Days of the American's involvement in the Vietnam War -- from the White House to Saigon and back again, as document by David Hume Kennerly, then President Gerald R. Ford's Chief White House Photographer
In early March of 1975, six months into the Ford Presidency, South Vietnam began to unravel when the North Vietnamese army attacked the Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot. After a few days of heavy fighting that saw thousands of casualties, particularly among the civilian population, that key city fell to the North Vietnamese.
This was a decisive battle of the Vietnam War that led to the complete destruction of South Vietnam's II Corps Tactical Zone and exposed the incredible weaknesses in the South Vietnamese Army. The defeat at Ban Me Thuot and the disastrous evacuation from the Central Highlands came about as a result of two major mistakes. In the days leading up to the assault on Ban Me Thuot, the South Vietnamese high command ignored intelligence which showed the presence of several North Vietnamese combat divisions around the district, and then President Nguyen Van Thieu's strategy to withdraw from the Central Highlands was poorly planned and implemented, resulting in a civilian disaster.
This was the beginning of the end for South Vietnam. - DHK
Courtesy of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum
President Gerald R. Ford with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the President's private office at the White House to discuss the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and the lack of Congressional support for more U.S. aid. The North Vietnamese had just started their attack against South Vietnamese positions in the Central Highlands.
The photo I took of Deputy National Security Advisor Gen. Brent Scowcroft in his White House office as he talked on the phone to a colleague at the Pentagon reflected the dire situation. Scrowcroft was the liaison between all the government agencies and Henry Kissinger, whom he would later replace as National Security Director. - DHK
Courtesy of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum
Deputy National Security Advisor Gen. Brent Scowcroft in his White House office reacts to the news that the South Vietnamese town of Ban Me Thuot has fallen to the North Vietnamese.
The North Vietnamese were now in Hue, and moving on Da Nang. It looked as if all of the northern provinces of South Vietnam would fall to the advancing Communist forces. On March 25th President Ford met in the oval office with U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Frederick Weyand. The president dispatched him on a fact-finding mission to Saigon to see if anything could be done to stem the advancing North Vietnamese tide. Gen. Weyand had heroically served several tours in Vietnam and knew the intricacies of the conflict. The president felt confident Weyand would give him the best assessment of the situation. Also included in the meeting were U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of South Vietnam Graham Martin, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and his deputy Gen. Brent Scowcroft. - DHK
Courtesy of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum
President Gerald R. Ford talks to U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Graham Martin, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Frederick Weyand, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the Oval Office the White House. President Ford dispatched Gen. Weyand on a mission to Vietnam to see if anything could be done to help the South Vietnamese government stem the tide of the advancing North Vietnamese Communists. Ambassador Martin, who was in the states for a medical problem, would return to Saigon with Weyand.
The president told Gen. Weyand, “Fred, you are going with the ambassador. This is one of the most significant missions you ever had. You are not going over there to lose, but to be tough and see what we can do.” The president continued, “We want your recommendation for the things which can be tough and shocking to the North. I regret I don’t have the authority to do some of the things President Nixon could do.” (These quotes are taken from recently declassified notes of that meeting). Secretary Kissinger asked, “What is the real situation and why? What can be done?” Weyand replied, “We will bring back a general appraisal and give them a shot in the arm.” - DHK
Courtesy of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum
President Gerald R. Ford at the end of his meeting with (L-R) Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Graham Martin, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Frederick Weyand, Ford, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the Oval Office the White House. President Ford sent Gen. Weyand and Ambassador Martin on a mission to Vietnam to see if anything could be done to stem the tide of the advancing North Vietnamese Communists.
After they left I took a photo of the president alone in the office, and he was frustrated. We talked about the trip, and because of my extensive experience in Vietnam, I told him I'd like to go with Weyand’s group. He agreed and said that he would depend on me to deliver to him my usually impartial and candid point of view when I got back. I did.
My office was on the ground floor of the White House. I dropped in to tell my staff that I was leaving early on a trip the next day. I hung a sign on my door that said, “Gone to Vietnam. Back in two weeks.” My staff thought I was joking until I didn’t turn up the next day, or for almost two weeks. Later that evening I went to say goodbye to the Fords and asked the president for a loan. These were the pre-ATM days. “The banks are closed, and I’ll be gone before they open, “I said. President Ford pulled all the bills that he had in his wallet. “Here’s forty seven dollars,” he said. “Don’t spend it all at once!”, Then he turned serious, put his arm around my shoulder, and said, “be careful.” - DHK
General Weyand’s plane, an Air Force C-141, made two refueling stops in Anchorage and Tokyo before reaching Saigon 24 hours later. I spent time on the trip, and there was plenty of it, talking to George Carver and Ted Shackley, two senior CIA officials. They were men who worked in the deepest, darkest shadows, and were major players in the Vietnam saga. - DHK
Once in Vietnam, I stayed at Ambassador Martin’s residence in Saigon. At that time, there was no official evacuation of Vietnamese underway. However, an NSC friend and his buddies knew that the end was in sight. They were running an effective, vast unofficial and underground network spiriting thousands of Vietnamese allies out of the country and to safety.
At the same time, the American news organizations were frantic about the safety of their Vietnamese employees and dependents. While there, I arranged an off-the-record meeting with the ambassador that resulted in an unofficial process to start getting some of those individuals out of the country. The ambassador thought some of these news organizations were hypocritical because while they were asking for help to get their own people to safety, they were reporting that there would be no reprisals against the southern Vietnamese if the northerners took over. Of course, it turned out that many southerners who were still trapped after the fall of Saigon were subject to severe reprisals. - DHK
My main mission was to get out of Saigon and not to participate in the official briefings that Gen. Weyand and his group were getting. I headed up north to the action in order to give the president the first-hand view that he was expecting from me. Da Nang was out of the question, it was in chaos, and under attack. No way to get there. I made my way to Nha Trang, a small city that was already overrun with refugees. Montcrieff Spear, the consul general there, was preparing to bail out, and his wife was packing when I arrived. But he first needed to find his colleague and fellow consul general Al Francis who had escaped from Da Nang. - DHK
U.S. Consul General Moncreiff Spear and I took an Air America chopper to nearby Cam Ranh Bay to look for Consul General Al Francis who had escaped from Da Nang on a ship that had been hijacked by fleeing South Vietnamese troops. We saw a ship crammed with thousands of troops, and at least one of them, in frustration I’m guessing, fired at our American-flagged chopper. They missed us, but the story was picked up by the wire services and my parents heard about it. My dad called the White House, asked to talk to the President, and got through to him thanks to a sympathetic phone operator. Ford assured him I was ok. My dad said, "He didn't tell us he was going back to Vietnam." And the president said, "That's your son for you." - DHK
Al Francis had made it onto a tugboat from the big ship, and that’s where we spotted him. He waved as we flew over, and we landed in Cam Ranh Bay to pick him up before he and Spear headed back to Saigon. Nha Trang was abandoned that day, and I made a detour over to Phnom Penh. - DHK
I was in Vietnam on a presidential pass, so I could have waved my White House orders at the CIA transport guys for a ride to Phnom Penh, and they would have had to do what I wanted. I thought the polite approach was better, however. I found a few pilots in the Air America hanger, and I asked, “Would any of you guys be willing to give me a lift over to Phnom Penh? I know it’s kind of dangerous . . .” They all jumped up, and said in unison, “I’ll take you!” Nothing like a little machismo moment among the CIA’s secret pilot’s society!
My old friend and colleague, Vietnamese-Lao-Thai-Khmer speaking colleague Matt Franjola was in Phnom Penh working for the Associated Press at the time, so I sent him a message and told him that I was getting a lift over there by a ballsy and intrepid pilot and asked whether he could pick me up. (I had the good sense not to mention that chauffer was a CIA-employed aviator, flying an Agency-owned aircraft).
Pochentong Airport was essentially closed and under constant fire. It was so bad there that the pilot told me as we approached in his Short Take-off and Landing (STOL) airplane that he was going to taxi by the terminal, and that he would slow down, but not stop. In other words, I would have to jump out as he cruised by the sandbagged terminal. And that’s what I did. There was nobody there --except Matt, who was sitting there in his jeep, nonchalant as always, as rockets exploded nearby. We hightailed it out of there, and he took me first for drinks at the old Le Phnom Hotel, our favorite haunt, where I had the special of the day, martinis and mortars. I also met up with photographer Al Rockoff and some other compatriots from my time working there. Matt caught me up on what was happening, then took me to an overcrowded hospital where I witnessed hundreds of suffering people wounded in the fighting. I photographed this woman being comforted by her husband. She had been hit by shrapnel, and died while I was there. - DHK
Matt dropped me off at the U.S. Embassy where I was given a Top Secret briefing by Ambassador John Gunther Dean and his staff on the situation in Cambodia. I vividly recall being in the tactical operations center looking at a map showing large red arrows representing the advancing Khmer Rouge pointing from all directions at the capital of Phnom Penh. We were surrounded. I looked at the ambassador and said, "You're kind of f...ed here." And he said, "No kidding."
The embassy staff was preparing a helicopter exodus for U.S. citizens and some allies if things got any worse. They painted a horrible and compelling picture about what might happen to any Americans and their Cambodian counterparts choosing to remain. If you saw the movie The Killing Fields you know they didn’t exaggerate.
When Matt collected me after the briefing I told him off the record that there was going to be an evacuation soon, and urged him not to play hero and stay, but get his ass out. He had never heard me sound so serious, and that got his attention. A few days later the U.S. commenced Operation Eagle Pull, and evacuated all the Americans and high risk Cambodians who wanted to leave Phnom Penh. Matt had considered staying, but with my voice ringing in his ears, decided to take the last helicopter out, and went from the frying pan into the fire, ending up in Saigon where he stayed after it fell to the Communists. After reporting that story, he safely got out of there also. - DHK
This little refugee girl was among thousands of people stuffed into an unfinished hotel on the banks of the Mekong River. I saw that she was wearing a dog tog, and its reflection is what caught my eye. Her photo has remained a symbol for me of all the suffering that kids the world over experience because of senseless wars. I have been haunted by her face ever since, and even traveled back to Phnom Penh several years ago to try and find her, but with no luck. - DHK
"If Ford wanted a Vietnamese report with the bark off, Kennerly was the man to give it to him. 'Cambodia is gone,' he told the president, 'and they're bullshitting you if they say that Vietnam has got more than three or four weeks left.' His words were blunt enough, but it was Kennerly's pictures that most eloquently portrayed the tragedy about to engulf South Vietnam and neighboring Cambodia.
- Presidential historian Richard Norton Smith
I reunited with General Frederick Weyand and Ambassador Graham Martin in time to attend their meeting with the beleaguered South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in his office at Saigon’s Presidential Palace. I took a photo of him at his desk that had a traditional Vietnamese painting behind him. I wondered how much longer he would be in that chair. Only eighteen days more as it turned out. - DHK
Ambassador Martin and General Weyand met with Thieu in his office at the Presidential Palace in Saigon on April 3. The beleaguered president asked for more military aid and B-52 support. Weyand said no to the bombers, but promised to continue the daily airlift of guns and ammunition.
Eighteen days later, on April 21, 1975, after a speech denouncing the United States, Thieu resigned and fled the country. His vice president Tran Van Huong (on the right in this photo) took over. A week later President Huong, resigned and handed power over to General Duong Van “Big” Minh who presided over the surrender of the government two days after that.
When I got back from Vietnam I presented President Ford with a really unpleasant show and tell. We went through large prints of the photos I took on the trip one by one. He saw the evacuation of Nha Trang, the ships full of fleeing South Vietnamese soldiers in Cam Ranh Bay, and the refugee children in Cambodia. My personal observations, along with those of the people in Vietnam that I respected, and my knowledge of the country, added up to, "the party’s over." Vietnam fell to the Communists 3 ½ weeks later.
When we got back to the White House a couple of days later I had all the colorful photos of cheery presidential social events replaced with the large stark black and white pictures of my documentation of the impending end of Vietnam and Cambodia. During the night an offended White House staffer took them down. The president was furious and ordered them put back on the West Wing walls. "Leave them up." he said emphatically. "Everyone should know what’s going on over there." The pictures made a significant impact on the president and other White House officials. President Ford told me that the photos and my stories factored in to his decision to allow thousands of Vietnamese refugees into the country. - DHK
Gen. Weyand made his presentation to President Ford at the president’s home in Palm Springs. Weyand wasn’t optimistic, but held out some hope that the encroaching North Vietnamese might be held off if Congress allotted more money for assistance. The president clearly didn’t like what he was hearing. - DHK
My new friends from the CIA pretty much corroborated the assessment I had given the president. This is a rare photo of CIA officials briefing the president. A little background on Ted Shackley. Known as “the Blond Ghost", his work included being station chief in Miami, during the period of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as head of the Cuban Project, known as Operation Mongoose, which he directed. He was also said to be the director of the Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War, as well as the CIA station chief in Laos between 1966–1968, and ran the secret war there. He was also CIA Saigon station chief from 1968 through February 1972. In 1976, he was put in charge of the CIA's worldwide covert operations.
Next to him is CIA Deputy Director George Carver, who played a significant role in the CIA's Vietnam Operations, including implementation of the Agent Orange program. He also weighed in, and the two of them gave the president their straightforward assessment. - DHK
The President and Mrs. Ford flew up to San Francisco after his briefing by Gen. Weyand and his associates to greet a plane-load of Vietnamese orphans arriving in the U.S. It was a sobering sight. Many of the kids had American fathers, and were considered to be at risk if the Communists took over. Those Amerasian kids who didn’t make it out were treated like second-class citizens or worse. - DHK
Operation Babylift was the mass evacuation of children ordered by President Ford from South Vietnam to the United States and other countries at the request of the Vietnamese government and non-governmental organizations who ran orphanages and relief agencies toward the end of the Vietnam War. The operation ran from April 3 through 26, 1975. By the final flight out of South Vietnam, over 3,300 infants and children had been evacuated. Along with Operation New Life, over 110,000 refugees were evacuated from South Vietnam at the end of the Vietnam War. Thousands of children were airlifted from Vietnam and adopted by families around the world. There was one tragedy associated with the airlift, an Air Force C-5A with orphans crashed killing 138 people, including 78 children. - DHK
Thousands of children were airlifted from Vietnam and adopted by families around the world. There was one tragedy associated with the airlift, an Air Force C-5A with orphans crashed killing 138 people, including 78 children. - DHK
By the time we got back to the White House, the North Vietnamese forces were getting closer to Saigon. Most of the northern part of the country had already fallen, and only a part of the south is left. Both CIA Director Colby and Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger appeared a bit morose when I photographed them in the Cabinet Room prior to an NSC meeting on Indochina. - DHK
CIA Director Bill Colby is pointing to a map of Vietnam and directing attention to Xuan Loc, a town only fifty miles east of Saigon. He told them about heavy fighting in the area as a result of attacks from a North Vietnamese Army division using armor and artillery.
Colby quotes intelligence that says fighting will intensify and the North Vietnamese are trying to achieve victory this year, not 1976 as earlier predicted. He says Communist victories have “far exceeded their expectations and have created ‘the most opportune moment’ for total victory this year.” They will press the attack in surrounding province, and attack Saigon when the time comes. Colby continued by saying that 18 infantry divisions were already in the south, and more on the way. “On paper, the GVN’s (Government of Vietnam’s) long-term prospects are bleak, no matter how well Saigon’s forces and commanders acquit themselves in the fighting that lies ahead.” (quoted from NSC minutes of the meeting). He went on to say, “Another factor is U.S. aid. A prompt and large-scale infusion would tend to restore confidence. The converse is obviously also true. The most likely outcome is a government willing to accept Communist terms, i.e. surrender.”
Colby also reported that Cambodia couldn’t hold on for more than another week. (The American evacuation of Phnom Penh was ordered two days later.)
The discussion turned to how many people to evacuate and whether to ask Congress for money to fund an evacuation in the president’s speech the following night in front of a joint session. President Ford said, “If we have a disaster, Congress will evade the responsibility. Let us get some language. I am sick and tired of their asking us to ignore the law or to enforce it, depending on whether or not it is to their advantage.” - DHK
President Ford allows some anxiety to show after ordering the execution of Operation Eagle Pull that will evacuate all Americans from Cambodia,
On April 21, and more than a week after the Cambodian operation was complete, the president and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger focused on the continuing problems in Vietnam. In a now de-classified conversation, Kissinger said he talked to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin about arranging a ceasefire to get Americans out. He then discussed problems with American ambassador to South Vietnam Graham Martin going rogue. Kissinger said, “I worried about Martin being Chinese Gordon* and causing a panic to prove he was right. So we have to treat him with care. I am afraid Martin accelerated Thieu’s departure.”
Brent Scowcroft added, ”His (Martin’s) talk with Thieu must have been provocative because of his quick action and blast at you.”
Kissinger said, “Martin should be told that our judgment is, as soon as the airport comes under fire, the DAO [Defense Attache's Office] personnel at Tan Son Nhut should be immediately taken out by C-130, not helicopters . . . He should not delay a move at Tan Son Nhut until it is irretrievably closed.”
*Charles “Chinese” Gordon was a British army officer and administrator who made his military reputation in China, where he was placed in command of the "Ever Victorious Army," a force of Chinese soldiers led by European officers. In the early 1860s, Gordon and his men were instrumental in putting down the Taiping Rebellion, regularly defeating much larger forces. For these accomplishments, he was given the nickname "Chinese" Gordon and was honored by both the Emperor of China and the British. (From Wikipedia) - DHK
At the end of the meeting the president said, “I understand the risk. It is mine and I am doing it. But let’s make sure we carry out the orders.
Vice President Rockefeller said, “You can’t insure the interests of America without risks.”
The president said, “With God’s help.”
Vice President Rockefeller said, “It takes real courage to do what is right in these conditions.”
The NSC meeting ended. - DHK
The last time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met with a president was during the Woodrow Wilson Administration on August 19, 1919, where Wilson appeared to argue in favor of its ratification of the Versailles Treaty, the peace settlement that ended the First World War. So it was a rare moment when they gathered in the Cabinet Room. The meeting with Ford was tense, and the prevailing advice to him was get out of Vietnam fast. They also didn’t want to give any more military aid to the Thieu regime. Joe Biden, a junior senator from Delaware and future president (at right in foreground), pretty much summed it up. He said, “I will vote for any amount for getting Americans out, but I don’t want it mixed with getting the Vietnamese out.” President Ford told them that he wasn’t going to start the pullout now to avoid panic.
During an NSC meeting, and as the Vietnam situation was heading off the edge of the cliff, the president was told by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that there were approximately 1700 Americans left in Saigon. The president said he wanted that number down to 1090 by Friday night. Schlesinger said, “That is a lot in one day.” The president replied, “That is what I ordered. There will be another order that by Sunday all non-essential non-governmental personnel must be out of there. The group that is left will stay until the order is issued to take them all out.” The president’s main concern was that the rate of evacuation not induce panic among the Vietnamese. - DHK
On April 25, the situation in Vietnam was clear to the president, and he wasn’t afraid to acknowledge the fact.
President Ford waves to the crowd at Tulane University where he said, “Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned. As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the Nation's wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence.” It was the first time he had publicly said that the war was “finished.” It ended five days later. - DHK
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was also the National Security Advisor, was the conduit of information to the president and vice president about the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. He would constantly provide updates directly to Ford that he received from Ambassador Martin in Saigon, the Defense Department, CIA, and his own State Department. Kissinger was action central, so I followed him around during the crisis knowing that he would intersect with the president many times during the day and night. - DHK
"President Ford understood Henry Kissinger. Understood his ego. Understood his insecurities. And played him very, very well." -- Brent Scowcroft
President Ford was a big admirer of Theodore Roosevelt and thought it was ironic that he sat under a portrait of the Rough rider as he dealt with ending the war in Vietnam. He told me that even Teddy Roosevelt wouldn’t have had any other choice but to evacuate the Americans from Saigon. I always wondered if Roosevelt would have made the choice to go there in the first place.
As Saigon was falling I could hear the voices of my past calling me back. Rather than being in the room where it was ending I wanted to be on the scene where it was happening. I was jealous of my friends Dirck Halstead, Matt Franjola, Nik Wheeler, and Hugh van Es (who made the famous photo of a line of people boarding a helicopter on a roof top). But I was in the White House action, and even though it wasn’t as exciting as Saigon, it was important historically. - DHK
This emergency meeting of the National Security Council was convened after the president got news that two U.S. Marines were killed by enemy fire at Ton San Nhut Airport and that North Vietnamese were within artillery range of the airport. Clearly, the US had very little time left to act and Ford had decided to bring the war to a conclusion. Seated around the table were America’s heavy hitters -- the president, vice president, secretary and deputy secretary of state, secretary and deputy secretary of defense, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, director of the CIA, and the White House chief of staff. - DHK
"Republicans and Democrats said, "Pull the forces out. It's hopeless."
His secretary of defense said, "Pull 'em out."
He refused. He kept those forces in while we were evaluating the Vietnamese who had fought with us. Solely on his own merit. Had it not worked, if our forces had been overrun, he would have been history. He just stood up there alone and took the burden on himself to save the lives of a bunch of our friends. It was real heroism. Almost nobody knows that story, but to me it is one of the classics of American history. I still get emotional about it." -- Brent Scowcroft
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George Brown talked about using helicopters. “. . . Americans should have priority if we have to terminate the lift, but we will not know this. We will not know in advance which is the last aircraft.”
Sec. Schlesinger said, “We should give them subtle priority.,” What he met was Americans first.
President Ford disagreed and wanted to “mix them” in. The president was also looking out for the Vietnamese. - DHK
The discussion then turned to what would happen if the U.S. fired on the advancing North Vietnamese to protect the evacuation. Secretary Kissinger said, “I think that, if we fire, we have to pull out the entire Embassy . . . The North Vietnamese have the intention of humiliating us and it seem unwise to leave people there.”
The President said, “I agree. All should leave. We have now made two decisions: First, today is the last day of Vietnamese evacuation. Second, if we fire, our people will go. Are we ready to go to a helicopter lift?
Gen. Brown replied, “Yes, if you or Ambassador Martin say so, we can have them there within an hour.”
Kissinger said, “We should not let it out that this is the last day of civilian evacuation.”
There was more discussion about how this would work, and if Tan Son Nhut was closed, starting the helicopter evacuation. General Brown said, “I do not want to see Americans standing there waiting for the last plane.” He also recommended that air cover come in to secure a helicopter lift. - DHK
(Direct quotes are from official minutes of the meeting, now declassified):
CIA Director William Colby opened the discussion at this NSC meeting with a report that, “the Viet Cong have rejected [now S. Vietnamese President] Minh’s cease-fire offer. They have added a third demand, which is to dismantle the South Vietnamese armed forces.” He went on to say that the situation had become more dangerous, and that enemy artillery was, “within range of Tan Son Nhut airport. At 4:00 a.m. they had a salvo of rockets against Tan Son Nhut. This is what killed the Marines.” He also said that surface to air missiles had been deployed in the area further increasing the risk factor. It's worth noting that Colby spent a lot of time during his career in Vietnam running operations. So he knew the turf - DHK
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. George Brown talked about bringing in 70 sorties of C-130s into Tan Son Nhut, with 35 aircraft coming in twice to evacuate the remaining 400 members of the Defense Attaché Office based there. He said the controller on the ground would have the discretion about whether this operation was feasible. Brown’s concern was, “the report of an aircraft being shot down by an SA-7 [a shoulder-fired surface to air missile]. Choppers or aircraft are defenseless against the SA-7” He continued, “Of course we have to do our mission, but if the risk becomes too great, we may need to turn off the lift.” Gen. Brown knew Vietnam. From 1968 to 1970 he had been commander there of the 7th Air Force. - DHK
Rockefeller was mostly silent during the meeting. His only question was, “Does the press know of the two Marines being killed?” Secretary of Defense Schlesinger told him they did. - DHK
President Ford knew his choices at this point were extremely limited. He was aware that if fixed-wing aircraft couldn’t land at Tan Son Nhut they would have to go to the final option.
Kissinger and Gen. Brown were talking about air cover for the operation. President Ford said, “We can await that until we see whether the C-130s can get in. If they cannot, then we go to Option 3,” (helicopter evacuation).
He looked around the room and said, “Is that agreed?” They all nodded. The meeting was over and the war was about to be. - DHK
What struck me at this particular moment was the gravity of the situation. Nobody was talking. The wheels were in motion. The deed was about to be done. This discussion of the final phase of the evacuation of Vietnam was not only a dramatic situation of great historic importance, but was also deeply personal for me. I was in the room and watching a war that I covered for over two years end in real time and before my eyes. Granted, we all knew it was coming, but this meeting was the last formal gathering of the men who would execute the president’s orders to pull the plug on a ten-year long debacle. Another thing that has occurred to me recently, I'm the only one still alive that was in this room. - DHK
Rumsfeld was the perfect White House chief of staff. He knew President Ford well and had helped him become minority leader of the House when they were in Congress. Ford picked Rumsfeld to replace Nixon’s chief of staff Al Haig and respected his opinion. Rumsfeld had no trouble speaking truth to power, and that is the first responsibility of an effective chief of staff. Here they discussed the timetable for getting the last evacuees out of Saigon. - DHK
The tension of the moment shows as Rumsfeld walks away from the president. - DHK
"Gerald Ford was a natural politician -- open, available, approachable. He had the characteristics of the only president who never ran for the position, didn't have a campaign platform, didn't come in with a specific program -- and was, I think, surprised that he was there. And yet, every single day he was in office, he got better and better at it." -- Donald Rumsfeld
The affection between First Lady Betty Ford and President Ford is clear in this moment. This just before he issued the order to begin the final evacuation of Americans by helicopter from Saigon. - DHK
The President of the United States is the person who has the final word on the big decisions. I always found his humanity to be the foundation of every judgment that President Ford made. On this night he made one of the toughest decisions of his life. Here he contemplates the ramifications with his wife First Lady Betty Ford at his side. As a combat veteran himself he didn’t have to travel far to put himself in the shoes of those executing a difficult and dangerous operation. When he pulled the trigger on the final operation he knew what it meant. – DHK
Kissinger briefs the president and Mrs. Ford. Minutes later the president issues the order to begin the final evacuation of Americans by helicopter from Saigon. - DHK
News came that no one wanted to hear. Henry Kissinger reported that the runways at Tan Son Nhut could not be used for evacuation. Worse, the population had gotten out of control and had flooded the runways. It was now impossible to land any more fixed wing aircraft. It was time to consider implementing Option 3, codenamed, “Operation Frequent Wind,” the final evacuation of Saigon by helicopter was at hand. - DHK
The president tells the Secretary of Defense to commence the final evacuation from Vietnam. I thought to myself, Jesus, this is really it. - DHK
America has lost the war in Vietnam. The weight of that reality is evident as President Ford talks to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and orders the implementation of “Operation Frequent Wind,” the final evacuation of Americans from Vietnam. That decision effectively ended the Vietnam War for America. - DHK
"He had experts around him. He had people who knew the circumstances, who had lived with the situations, who knew how to set up decisions for him. So he didn't have to do that part. But had to do what only the president can: Make the decision. And for that, he was equipped both as a Midwesterner and as a man." -- Brent Scowcroft
Of all the Administration officials since those who served Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, Henry Kissinger is one of the most controversial and the most closely identified with the Vietnam War. He was a proponent of Nixon’s “Vietnamization” of the conflict and also played a key role in the bombing of Cambodia to disrupt attacks on South Vietnam by the Communists. Kissinger, along with North Vietnam’s Le Duc Tho, won the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for helping to establish a ceasefire and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Tho refused to accept the award, perhaps knowing that they had no intention of honoring the commitment. Not surprisingly the agreement didn’t hold up. The expression on Kissinger’s face reflects this bitter conclusion for a failed U.S. policy and war in the late hours of the final evacuation of Americans from Vietnam. - DHK
"There was something about Vietnam that broke your heart at every stage." -- Henry Kissinger
Kissinger talks to Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon to tell him that he needs to evacuate the U.S. Embassy immediately and that helicopters are on the way.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Scowcroft’s office after he told U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin to begin the final evacuation from Saigon. He told Martin to leave as soon as possible. - DHK
Henry Kissinger can only wait for news of the evacuation now happening halfway around the world. Once the orders have been issued, it's up to other people to carry them out. There is nothing more he can do. - DHK
White House Chief of Staff Don Rumsfeld keeps track of the fast moving situation. He would later become President Ford’s Secretary of Defense, the nation’s youngest, and then many years later President George W. Bush’s Defense Secretary, and with it the dubious honor of being the nation’s oldest. - DHK
I spent the rest of the evening tracking the main participants who were overseeing the nuts and bolts of the final evacuation. Gen. Scowcroft was at the control center, and all information flowed through him to Secretary Kissinger and other White House officials right up to the president. - DHK
President Ford has breakfast alone in the White House Residence the morning after issuing the orders to start the final evacuation. He once told me that he always got up earlier than the family. It was the only time he had to himself during the day. - DHK
President Ford holds his regular daily meeting with CIA briefer David Peterson who brought him up to date on matters outside of the Vietnam evacuation. Peterson’s top secret briefing was how the president normally started his early mornings before everything else kicked into gear.
By the time this cabinet meeting was convened the evacuation was well underway and only 200 Americans were awaiting a ride out of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. The president appeared down as the impact of the last few days sunk in. Over Ford’s shoulder is Deputy Chief of Staff Dick Cheney who would go on to become chief of staff, a U.S. Congressman, and Vice President of the United States. - DHK
"To sit in the White House and know that we, the United States, were being whipped, defeated, was not a pleasant experience for the president and commander in chief.
The South Vietnamese forces were inadequate to protect us, and our only choice was to get all American personnel, military and civilian, and as many of our South Vietnamese friends as possible out. Our forces were literally surrounded at the embassy. It was a hectic, tragic twenty-four hours.
To see that transpiring was probably as low a point in my administration as any." -- Gerald R. Ford
Prior to the meeting of bi-partisan leaders in the Cabinet Room, the president sat down with Sen. Robert Byrd of West Virginia. This meeting with Byrd and the other Congressional leaders was to answer their questions about the evacuation, and some funding issues that the president was requesting for refugee assistance. The president told them that more than 45,000 high risk Vietnamese had been taken out over the last few days.
Secretary Kissinger told them he estimated that 90% of that group would come to the states, but that other countries had been approached to take some as well. He thought that 50,000 would be the top number coming to the states. One of the congressmen said that 50 thousand was all this country could absorb. Secretary Kissinger said, “There is no way the total number can go much beyond 50,000.” He was a bit off in that estimate. By 1980 the number of Vietnamese who escaped Communist rule in their country to U.S. shores was over 230,000, and today’s population of Vietnamese is more than 1,250,000, the sixth largest foreign-born population in the United States. - DHK
I shadowed Secretary Kissinger during most of the two-day Vietnam evacuation drama. He was where the action was, and was in non-stop motion. I ping ponged back and forth from his NSC quarters, to the oval office, the cabinet room, and wherever the story took me. Not surprisingly, the story was usually Kissinger.
A few hours earlier Ambassador Martin had been pleading for more choppers to evacuate more Vietnamese, but time and the president’s patience was running out. He issued a direct order to Martin to get the last Americans out of there, and himself with them. Kissinger made a humorous and admiring reference to Martin that, “he got five hundred of his last 100 Vietnamese evacuees out.” At 4:58 pm Washington, D.C. time the ambassador climbed aboard a helicopter and flew out to the U.S. fleet. For him, and the United States, the Vietnam War was over. Kissinger acknowledged that Martin “ was in a very difficult position. He felt a moral obligation to the people with whom he had been associated, and he attempted to save as many of those as possible. That is not the worst fault a man can have.”
As the evacuation was drawing to a close (or so we all thought), I caught the energetic NSC chairman/Secretary of State rounding the corner as he headed into the oval office with an update for the president. - DHK
Kissinger burst into the president’s economic meeting to tell him that the evacuation of Saigon was almost complete, and he thought Ambassador Martin would be out shortly. I was always amazed that with all the excitement and tension swirling around this operation, it was still business as usual in the White House. The president’s schedule for that day had many meetings related to the Vietnam situation, but many that were not, such as this one. - DHK
An air of celebration filled the air when Henry Kissinger gave President Ford the good news that the evacuation was wrapped up. The U.S. Ambassador had finally left, and it was time to move on to the next crisis.
I have photographed a few thousand handshakes in my time and find that they tend to pretty much all look alike. This one was no different visually -- the President of the United State congratulating his National Security Advisor/Secretary of State for overseeing the successful evacuation of Americans and thousands of Vietnamese from Vietnam. Unfortunately, this particular well done was a bit premature. - DHK
Sec. Kissinger and his entourage walked to the Old Executive Office Building to announce to the press that our latest national nightmare was successfully concluded after the safe evacuation of all the Americans who wanted to leave Saigon. - DHK
White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen opened up the press conference by reading a statement from the president stating that the evacuation of Saigon was complete. The message ended by saying, “This action closes a chapter in the American experience. The President asks all Americans to close ranks to avoid recriminations about the past, to look ahead to the many goals we share, and to work together on the great tasks that remain to be accomplished.”
Kissinger followed with his own statement, then was asked, “are you confident that all the Americans that wanted to come out are out of Saigon?” Kissinger said, “I am confident that every American who wanted to come out is out . . .” They weren't. - DHK
Less than an hour after Kissinger made that decisive statement that, “I am confidant that every American who wanted to come out is out . . . “ to the press and the rest of the world, Deputy NSC Advisor Brent Scowcroft drops the bombshell to his boss that a platoon Marines were left on the U.S. Embassy roof in Saigon. According to Donald Rumsfeld’s book, “Known and Unknown, “Kissinger and Schlesinger each considered the other’s department responsible for the miscommunication. The president felt Schlesinger bore responsibility and said he was ‘damn mad’ about it”. Rumsfeld thought that what had been told to the American people in the press conference “simply was not true.” He said, “This war has been marked by so many lies and evasions that it is not right to have the war end with one last lie.” The president agreed.
Later that year President Ford replaced Schlesinger with Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. - DHK
Henry Kissinger tells President Ford that a platoon of U.S. Marines were stranded on the roof of the U.S. Embassy after they had announced that the evacuation was successfully over. The president, as you can see from this picture, was not pleased with the news. "Let me know when they're out." - DHK
NSC staffer Robert "Bud" McFarlane works the phones as he monitors the rescue of Marines who were stranded on the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. McFarlane, a Marine himself, and a two-tour Vietnam combat veteran, became President Reagan’s national security advisor in 1983, and resigned two years later when he got caught up in the Iran-Contra affair. - DHK
Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger anxiously await word of the fate of the U.S. Marines who were stranded on the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. - DHK
Tension grows as Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Kissinger’s military assistant Bud McFarlane wait for news of the stranded Marines. - DHK
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his White House Office takes his formal attire from a paper bag preparing for a black tie dinner with Jordan’s King Hussein as he awaits word on the fate of the U.S. Marines stranded on the US Embassy roof in Saigon.
Finally, cause to celebrate. Kissinger and colleagues react to the news that the Marines have lifted off from the U.S. Embassy roof, safe and sound.
Press Secretary Nessen released this statement after the Marines had been successfully rescued: “Earlier today we announced that the evacuation had been completed. At that time we were not aware that an element of the ground security force remained to be evacuated. Therefore, the completion of the evacuation of these personnel actually occurred after the conclusion of the press conference. Latest reports indicate that the remaining security forces now have been evacuated.”
And that was that. - DHK
Because I was with Kissinger I was not there for this moment but made sure someone else was. One of my staff photographers, Karl Schumacher, was with the president when he got the call from the secretary of defense that the Marines were out.
The president took the call in the middle of a state dinner for His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. He was relieved.
In early March of 1975, six months into the Ford Presidency, South Vietnam began to unravel when the North Vietnamese army attacked the Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot. After a few days of heavy fighting that saw thousands of casualties, particularly among the civilian population, that key city fell to the North Vietnamese.
This was a decisive battle of the Vietnam War that led to the complete destruction of South Vietnam's II Corps Tactical Zone and exposed the incredible weaknesses in the South Vietnamese Army. The defeat at Ban Me Thuot and the disastrous evacuation from the Central Highlands came about as a result of two major mistakes. In the days leading up to the assault on Ban Me Thuot, the South Vietnamese high command ignored intelligence which showed the presence of several North Vietnamese combat divisions around the district, and then President Nguyen Van Thieu's strategy to withdraw from the Central Highlands was poorly planned and implemented, resulting in a civilian disaster.
This was the beginning of the end for South Vietnam. - DHK
Courtesy of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum
President Gerald R. Ford with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the President's private office at the White House to discuss the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and the lack of Congressional support for more U.S. aid. The North Vietnamese had just started their attack against South Vietnamese positions in the Central Highlands.
In early 1971 United Press International assigned me to their Saigon bureau to replace photographer Kent Potter who was rotating out. On Feb. 10, 1971, Potter and three other photographers perished when their chopper was shot down over Laos during the Lam Son 719 operation. Larry Burrows of Life, Henri Huet of the AP, and Keisaburo Shimamoto of Newsweek were among those who died. I didn't know any of those great photographers, but Burrows was a personal hero, and his photos inspired my desire to cover the war. A few weeks later, and shortly after I turned 24, I was on a plane bound for Saigon.
I spent over two years photographing combat in Indochina, and In 1972, I was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for my previous year’s work in Vietnam, Cambodia, and India where I photographed refugees escaping across the border from East Pakistan.
Vietnam became part of my DNA, and everything that has happened to me since has been informed by that experience. I was 24, and my first year as a combat photographer was so intense, and there were so many close calls, I really never figured to see 25. When I celebrated that birthday in Saigon, I felt that every one after was a bonus. So far that windfall has added up to an extra 53 years! I have tried to use them well.
I returned to the states in mid-1973 to go to work for TIME Magazine. One of my early assignments was the Watergate melee, and I was also assigned to photograph House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford after Vice President Agnew resigned in the fall of that year. A portrait that I took of Ford ran on the cover of TIME when President Nixon announced that he would replace Agnew as the new vice president. TIME then assigned me to cover Ford full-time. When President Nixon resigned, and Ford replaced him, he asked me to be his chief photographer. With that job came total access, not just to the President and his family, but to everything that was going on behind the scenes. It was quite an honor, wildly exciting, and one of the most professionally and personally rewarding times of my life.
David Hume Kennerly's archive can be found at the Center for Creative Photography at the University of Arizona in Tucson, which holds the copyright to his work. However, the images he took as President Gerald R. Ford's Chief White House photographer fall within the public domain.
This is my account of the final days of Vietnam. Direct quotes from the participants are from declassified minutes of National Security Council meetings, Memorandums of Conversations, Cabinet meetings, White House press conferences, President Ford’s book, “A Time to Heal,” Donald Rumsfeld’s book “Known and Unknown,” and my autobiography, “Shooter.”
Some of the time stamps with the images are estimates based on David's recollection of the order of events that he photographed. Other time stamps are accurate, as documented in records of President Gerald R. Ford's presidency.